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Abstract
By considering a least squares approximation of a given square integrable
function f ∶ [0;1]n → R by a multilinear polynomial of a specied degree, we
dene an index which measures the overall interaction among variables of f .
This denition extends the concept of Banzhaf interaction index introduced
in cooperative game theory. Our approach is partly inspired from multilinear
regression analysis, where interactions among the independent variables are
taken into consideration. We show that this interaction index has appealing
properties which naturally generalize several properties of the Banzhaf inter-
action index. In particular, we interpret this index as an expected value of
the dierence quotients of f or, under certain natural conditions on f , as an
expected value of the derivatives of f . Finally, we discuss a few applications
of the interaction index in aggregation function theory.
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1. Introduction
Sophisticated mathematical models are extensively used in a variety of
areas of mathematics and physics, and especially in applied elds such as
engineering, life sciences, economics, nance, and many others. Here we
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consider the simple situation where the model aims at explaining a single
dependent variable, call it y, in terms of n independent variables x1; : : : ; xn.
Such a model is usually described through an equation of the form
y = f(x1; : : : ; xn);
where f is a real function of n variables.
Now, suppose that the function f describing the model is given and that
we want to investigate its behavior through simple terms. For instance, sup-
pose we want to measure the overall contribution (importance or inuence) of
each independent variable to the model. A natural approach to this problem
consists in dening the overall importance of each variable as the coecient
of this variable in the least squares linear approximation of f . This approach
was considered by Hammer and Holzman [14] for pseudo-Boolean functions
and cooperative games f ∶{0;1}n → R. Interestingly enough, they observed
that the coecient of each variable in the linear approximation is exactly the
Banzhaf power index [3, 7] of the corresponding player in the game f .
In many practical situations, the information provided by the overall im-
portance degree of each variable may be far insucient due to the possible
interactions among the variables. Then, a more exible approach to investi-
gate the behavior of f consists in measuring an overall importance degree for
each combination (subset) of variables. Such a concept was rst introduced
in [16] for Boolean functions f ∶{0;1}n → {0;1} (see also [5, 6]), then in [17]
for pseudo-Boolean functions and games f ∶{0;1}n → R (see also [18]), and in
[9] for square integrable functions f ∶ [0;1]n → R.
In addition to these importance indexes, we can also measure directly
the interaction degree among the variables by dening an overall interaction
index for each combination of variables. This concept was introduced ax-
iomatically in [13] (see also [8]) for games f ∶{0;1}n → R. However, it has
not yet been extended to real functions dened on [0;1]n, even though such
functions are of growing importance for instance in aggregation function the-
ory. In this paper we intend to ll this gap by dening and investigating
an appropriate index to measure the interaction degree among variables of a
given square integrable function f ∶ [0;1]n → R.
Our sources of inspiration to dene such an index are actually threefold:
In cooperative game theory: Interaction indexes were introduced axiomat-
ically a decade ago [13] for games f ∶{0;1}n → R (see also [8]). The best
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known interaction indexes are the Banzhaf and Shapley interaction in-
dexes, which extend the Banzhaf and Shapley power indexes. Following
Hammer and Holzman's approach [14], it was shown in [11] that the
Banzhaf interaction index can be obtained from least squares approx-
imations of the game under consideration by games whose multilinear
representations are of lower degrees.
In analysis: Considering a suciently dierentiable real function f of sev-
eral variables, the local interaction among certain variables at a given
point a can be obtained through the coecients of the Taylor expan-
sion of f at a, that is, through the coecients of the local polynomial
approximation of f at a. By contrast, if we want to dene an overall
interaction index, we naturally have to consider a global approximation
of f by a polynomial function.
In statistics: Multilinear statistical models have been proposed to take into
account the interaction among the independent variables (see for in-
stance [1]): two-way interactions appear as the coecients of leading
terms in quadratic models, three-way interactions appear as the coe-
cients of leading terms in cubic models, and so forth.
On the basis of these observations, we naturally consider the least squares
approximation problem of a given square integrable function f ∶ [0;1]n → R by
a polynomial of a given degree. As multiple occurrences in combinations of
variables are not relevant, we will only consider multilinear polynomial func-
tions. Then, given a subset S ⊆ {1; : : : ; n}, an index I(f;S) measuring the
interaction among the variables {xi ∶ i ∈ S} of f is dened as the coecient of
the monomial ∏i∈S xi in the best approximation of f by a multilinear polyno-
mial of degree at most ∣S∣. This denition is given and discussed in Section 2,
where we also provide an interpretation in the context of cooperative fuzzy
games (Remark 1).
In Section 3 we show that this new index has many appealing proper-
ties, such as linearity, continuity, and symmetry. In particular, we show
that, similarly to the Banzhaf interaction index introduced for games, the
index I(f;S) can be interpreted in a sense as an expected value of the dis-
crete derivative of f in the direction of S (Theorem 10) or, equivalently,
as an expected value of the dierence quotient of f in the direction of S
(Corollary 11). Under certain natural conditions on f , the index can also
be interpreted as an expected value of the derivative of f in the direction of
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S (Proposition 7). These latter results reveal a strong analogy between the
interaction index and the overall importance index introduced by Grabisch
and Labreuche [9].
In Section 4 we discuss certain applications in aggregation function theory,
including the computation of explicit expressions of the interaction index for
the discrete Choquet integrals. We also dene and investigate a normalized
version of the interaction index to compare dierent functions in terms of
interaction degrees of their variables and a coecient of determination to
measure the quality of multilinear approximations.
We employ the following notation throughout the paper. Let In denote
the n-dimensional unit cube [0;1]n. We denote by F (In) the class of all
functions f ∶ In → R and by L2(In) the class of square integrable functions
f ∶ In → R (modulo equality almost everywhere). For any S ⊆ N = {1; : : : ; n},
we denote by 1S the characteristic vector of S in {0;1}n.
2. Interaction indexes
In this section we rst recall the concepts of power and interaction indexes
introduced in cooperative game theory and how the Banzhaf index can be
obtained from the solution of a least squares approximation problem. Then
we show how this approximation problem can be extended to functions in
L2(In) and, from this extension, we introduce an interaction index for such
functions.
Recall that a (cooperative) game on a nite set of players N = {1; : : : ; n}
is a set function v∶2N → R which assigns to each coalition S of players a real
number v(S) representing the worth of S.1 Through the usual identication
of the subsets of N with the elements of {0;1}n, a game v∶2N → R can be
equivalently described by a pseudo-Boolean function f ∶{0;1}n → R. The
correspondence is given by v(S) = f(1S) and
f(x) = ∑
S⊆N v(S)∏i∈S xi ∏i∈N∖S(1 − xi): (1)
Equation (1) shows that any pseudo-Boolean function f ∶{0;1}n → R can
always be represented by a multilinear polynomial of degree at most n (see
1Usually, the condition v(∅) = 0 is required for v to dene a game. However, we do not
need this restriction in the present paper.
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[15]), which can be further simplied into
f(x) = ∑
S⊆N a(S)∏i∈S xi ; (2)
where the set function a∶2N → R, called the Mobius transform of v, is dened
by
a(S) = ∑
T⊆S(−1)∣S∣−∣T ∣ v(T ):
Let GN denote the set of games on N . A power index [21] on N is a
function ∶GN ×N → R that assigns to every player i ∈ N in a game f ∈ GN
his/her prospect (f; i) from playing the game. An interaction index [13] on
N is a function I ∶GN×2N → R that measures in a game f ∈ GN the interaction
degree among the players of a coalition S ⊆ N .
For instance, the Banzhaf interaction index [13] of a coalition S ⊆ N in a
game f ∈ GN is dened (in terms of the Mobius transform of f) by
IB(f;S) = ∑
T⊇S (12)∣T ∣−∣S∣a(T ); (3)
and the Banzhaf power index [7] of a player i ∈ N in a game f ∈ GN is dened
by B(f; i) = IB(f;{i}).
It is noteworthy that IB(f;S) can be interpreted as an average of the
S-dierence (or discrete S-derivative) Sf of f . Indeed, it can be shown
(see [11, §2]) that
IB(f;S) = 1
2n
∑
x∈{0;1}n(Sf)(x); (4)
where Sf is dened inductively by ∅f = f and Sf = {i}S∖{i}f for
i ∈ S, with {i}f(x) = f(x ∣ xi = 1) − f(x ∣ xi = 0).
We now recall how the Banzhaf interaction index can be obtained from
a least squares approximation problem. For k ∈ {0; : : : ; n}, denote by Vk the
set of all multilinear polynomials g∶{0;1}n → R of degree at most k, that is
of the form
g(x) = ∑
S⊆N∣S∣⩽k
c(S)∏
i∈S xi ; (5)
where the coecients c(S) are real numbers. For a given pseudo-Boolean
function f ∶{0;1}n → R, the best kth approximation of f is the unique mul-
tilinear polynomial fk ∈ Vk that minimizes the squared distance∑
x∈{0;1}n(f(x) − g(x))2
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among all g ∈ Vk. A closed-form expression of fk was given in [14] for k = 1
and k = 2 and in [11] for arbitrary k ⩽ n. In fact, when f is given in its
multilinear form (2) we obtain
fk(x) = ∑
S⊆N∣S∣⩽k
ak(S)∏
i∈S xi;
where
ak(S) = a(S) + (−1)k−∣S∣ ∑
T⊇S∣T ∣>k
(∣T ∣ − ∣S∣ − 1
k − ∣S∣ ) (12)∣T ∣−∣S∣a(T ):
It is then easy to see that
IB(f;S) = a∣S∣(S): (6)
Thus, IB(f;S) is exactly the coecient of the monomial ∏i∈S xi in the best
approximation of f by a multilinear polynomial of degree at most ∣S∣.
Taking into account this approximation problem, we now dene an in-
teraction index for functions in L2(In) as follows. Denote by Wk the set
of all multilinear polynomials g∶ In → R of degree at most k. Clearly, these
functions are also of the form (5). For a given function f ∈ L2(In), we dene
the best kth (multilinear) approximation of f as the multilinear polynomial
fk ∈Wk that minimizes the squared distance
∫
In
(f(x) − g(x))2 dx (7)
among all g ∈Wk.
It is easy to see that Wk is a linear subspace of L2(In) of dimension∑ks=0 (ns). Indeed, Wk is the linear span of the basis Bk = {vS ∶ S ⊆ N; ∣S∣ ⩽
k}, where the functions vS ∶ In → R are dened by vS(x) = ∏i∈S xi. Note
that formula (7) also writes ∥f − g∥2 where ∥ ⋅ ∥ is the standard norm of
L2(In) associated with the inner product ⟨f; g⟩ = ∫In f(x)g(x)dx. Therefore,
using the general theory of Hilbert spaces, the solution of this approximation
problem exists and is uniquely determined by the orthogonal projection of f
onto Wk. This projection can be easily expressed in any orthonormal basis
of Wk. But here it is very easy to see that the set B′k = {wS ∶ S ⊆ N; ∣S∣ ⩽ k},
where wS ∶ In → R is given by
wS(x) = 12∣S∣/2∏
i∈S (xi − 12) = 12∣S∣/2 ∑T⊆S ( − 12)∣S∣−∣T ∣vT (x);
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forms such an orthonormal basis for Wk.
The following immediate theorem gives the components of the best kth
approximation of a function f ∈ L2(In) in the bases Bk and B′k.
Theorem 1. For every k ∈ {0; : : : ; n}, the best kth approximation of f ∈
L2(In) is the function
fk = ∑
T⊆N∣T ∣⩽k
⟨f;wT ⟩wT = ∑
S⊆N∣S∣⩽k
ak(S) vS ; (8)
where
ak(S) = ∑
T⊇S∣T ∣⩽k
(− 1
2
)∣T ∣−∣S∣12∣T ∣/2 ⟨f;wT ⟩: (9)
By analogy with (6), to measure the interaction degree among variables of
an arbitrary function f ∈ L2(In), we naturally dene an index I ∶L2(In)×2N →
R as I(f;S) = a∣S∣(S), where a∣S∣(S) is obtained from f by (9). We will see
in the next section that this index indeed measures an importance degree
when ∣S∣ = 1 and an interaction degree when ∣S∣ ⩾ 2.
Denition 2. Let I ∶L2(In) × 2N → R be dened as I(f;S) = 12∣S∣/2⟨f;wS⟩,
that is, I(f;S) = 12∣S∣∫
In
f(x)∏
i∈S (xi − 12)dx: (10)
Thus we have dened an interaction index from an approximation (pro-
jection) problem. Conversely, this index characterizes this approximation
problem. Indeed, as the following result shows, the best kth approximation
of f ∈ L2(In) is the unique function ofWk that preserves the interaction index
for all the s-subsets such that s ⩽ k. The discrete analogue of this result was
established in [11] for the Banzhaf interaction index (3).
Proposition 3. A function fk ∈ Wk is the best kth approximation of f ∈
L2(In) if and only if I(f;S) = I(fk; S) for all S ⊆ N such that ∣S∣ ⩽ k.
Proof. By denition, we have I(f;S) = I(fk; S) if and only if ⟨f −fk;wS⟩ = 0
for all S ⊆ N such that ∣S∣ ⩽ k, and the latter condition characterizes the
projection of f onto Wk.
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The explicit conversion formulas between the interaction index and the
best approximation can be easily derived from the preceding results. On the
one hand, by (9), we have
ak(S) = ∑
T⊇S∣T ∣⩽k
(− 1
2
)∣T ∣−∣S∣ I(f; T ) ; for ∣S∣ ⩽ k:
On the other hand, by Proposition 3 and Equation (8), we also have
I(f;S) = I(fk; S) = 12∣S∣/2 ⟨fk;wS⟩= 12∣S∣/2 ∑
T⊆N∣T ∣⩽k
ak(T ) ⟨vT ;wS⟩
that is, by calculating the inner product,
I(f;S) = ∑
T⊇S∣T ∣⩽k
(1
2
)∣T ∣−∣S∣ ak(T ) ; for ∣S∣ ⩽ k: (11)
We also note that, by (8), the best kth approximation of f can be ex-
pressed in terms of I as
fk(x) = ∑
T⊆N∣T ∣⩽k
I(f; T )∏
i∈T (xi − 12): (12)
Using the notation 1
2
= (12 ; : : : ; 12), the Taylor expansion formula then shows
that I(f;S) = (DSfk)(12) ; for ∣S∣ ⩽ k,
where DS stands for the partial derivative operator with respect to the vari-
ables xi for i ∈ S. In particular, I(f;∅) = ∫In f(x)dx = fk(12).
We also have the following result, which shows that the index I generalizes
the Banzhaf interaction index IB. First note that the restriction operation
f ↦ f ∣{0;1}n denes a linear bijection between the spaces Wn and Vn. The
inverse map is the so-called \multilinear extension".
Proposition 4. For every function f ∈Wn and every subset S ⊆ N , we haveI(f;S) = IB(f ∣{0;1}n ; S).
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Proof. Let f ∈ Wn of the form f(x) = ∑T⊆N a(T )∏i∈T xi and let S ⊆ N .
Then, using (11) for k = n and recalling that a(T ) = an(T ) for every T ⊆ N ,
we obtain I(f;S) = ∑
T⊇S (12)∣T ∣−∣S∣ a(T ):
We then conclude by formula (3).
Remark 1. In cooperative game theory, the set F (In) can be interpreted as
the set of fuzzy games (see for instance Aubin [2]). In this context, a fuzzy
coalition is simply an element x ∈ In and a fuzzy game f ∈ F (In) is a mapping
that associates with any fuzzy coalition its worth. It is now clear that the
index I is a natural extension of the Banzhaf interaction index to fuzzy
games in L2(In) when this index is regarded as a solution of a multilinear
approximation problem.
3. Properties and interpretations
Most of the interaction indexes dened for games, including the Banzhaf
interaction index, share a set of fundamental properties such as linearity,
symmetry, and monotonicity (see [8]). Many of them can also be expressed
as expected values of the discrete derivatives (dierences) of their arguments
(see for instance (4)). In this section we show that the index I fullls direct
generalizations of these properties to the framework of functions of L2(In).
In particular, we show that I(f;S) can be interpreted as an expected value
of the dierence quotient of f in the direction of S or, under certain natural
conditions on f , as an expected value of the derivative of f in the direction
of S.
The rst result follows from the very denition of the index.
Proposition 5. For every S ⊆ N , the mapping f ↦ I(f;S) is linear and
continuous.
Recall that if  is a permutation on N , then, for every function f ∈
F (In), the permutation  acts on f by (f)(x1; : : : ; xn) = f(x(1); : : : ; x(n)):
The following result is then an easy consequence of the change of variables
theorem.
Proposition 6. The index I is symmetric. That is, for every permutation 
on N , every f ∈ L2(In), and every S ⊆ N , we have I((f); (S)) = I(f;S).
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We now provide an interpretation of I(f;S) as an expected value of
the S-derivative DSf of f . The proof immediately follows from repeated
integrations by parts of (10) and thus is omitted.
For S ⊆ N , denote by hS the probability density function of indepen-
dent beta distributions on In with parameters  =  = 2, that is, hS(x) =
6∣S∣∏i∈S xi(1 − xi).
Proposition 7. For every S ⊆ N and every f ∈ L2(In) such that DTf is
continuous and integrable on ]0;1[n for all T ⊆ S, we have
I(f;S) = ∫
In
hS(x)DSf(x)dx: (13)
Remark 2. (a) Formulas (4) and (13) show a strong analogy between the
indexes IB and I. Indeed, IB(f;S) is the expected value of the S-
dierence of f with respect to the discrete uniform distribution whereasI(f;S) is the expected value of the S-derivative of f with respect to a
beta distribution. We will see in Theorem 10 a similar interpretation
of I(f;S) which does not require all the assumptions of Proposition 7.
(b) Propositions 3 and 7 reveal an analogy between least squares approx-
imations and Taylor expansion formula. Indeed, while the k-degree
Taylor expansion of f at a given point a can be seen as the unique
polynomial of degree at most k whose derivatives at a coincide with
the derivatives of f at the same point, the best kth approximation of
f is the unique multilinear polynomial of degree at most k that agrees
with f in all average S-derivatives for ∣S∣ ⩽ k.
We now give an alternative interpretation of I(f;S) as an expected value,
which does not require the additional assumptions of Proposition 7. In this
more general framework, we naturally replace the derivative with a dierence
quotient. To this extent, we introduce some further notation. As usual, we
denote by ei the ith vector of the standard basis of Rn. For every S ⊆ N and
every h ∈ In, we dene the S-shift operator ESh on F (In) by
EShf(x) = f(x +∑
j∈S hjej)
for every x ∈ In such that x + h ∈ In.
We also dene the S-dierence (or discrete S-derivative) operator Sh
on F (In) inductively by ∅hf = f and Shf = {i}h S∖{i}h f for i ∈ S, with
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{i}
h f(x) = E{i}h f(x) − f(x): Similarly, we dene the S-dierence quotient
operator QSh on F (In) by Q∅hf = f and QShf = Q{i}h QS∖{i}h f for i ∈ S, with
Q
{i}
h f(x) = 1hi{i}h f(x):
The next straightforward lemma provides a direct link between the dif-
ference operators and the shift operators. It actually shows that, for every
xed h ∈ In, the map S ↦Sh is nothing other than the Mobius transform of
the map S ↦ ESh .
Lemma 8. For every f ∈ F (In) and every S ⊆ N , we have
Shf(x) = ∑
T⊆S(−1)∣S∣−∣T ∣ETh f(x): (14)
Let us interpret the S-dierence operator through a simple example. For
n = 3 and S = {1;2}, we have
Shf(x) = f(x1+h1; x2+h2; x3)−f(x1+h1; x2; x3)−f(x1; x2+h2; x3)+f(x1; x2; x3):
In complete analogy with the discrete concept of marginal interaction among
players in a coalition S ⊆ N (see [11, §2]), the value Shf(x) can be interpreted
as the marginal interaction among variables xi (i ∈ S) at x with respect to
the increases hi for i ∈ S.
Setting h = y − x in the example above, we obtain
Sy−xf(x) = f(y1; y2; x3) − f(y1; x2; x3) − f(x1; y2; x3) + f(x1; x2; x3):
If xi ⩽ yi for every i ∈ S, then Sy−xf(x) is naturally called the f -volume of
the box ∏i∈S[xi; yi]. The following straightforward lemma shows that, when
f = vS, Sy−xf(x) is exactly the volume of the box ∏i∈S[xi; yi].
Lemma 9. For every S ⊆ N , we have Sy−xvS(x) =∏i∈S(yi − xi):
In the remaining part of this paper, the notation yS ∈ [xS;1] means that
yi ∈ [xi;1] for every i ∈ S.
Theorem 10. For every f ∈ L2(In) and every S ⊆ N , we have
I(f;S) = 1
(S) ∫x∈In ∫yS∈[xS ;1]Sy−xf(x)dyS dx; (15)
where
(S) = ∫
x∈In ∫yS∈[xS ;1]Sy−xvS(x)dyS dx = 6−∣S∣:
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Proof. Since the result is trivial if S = ∅, we can assume that S ≠ ∅. We rst
observe that the value of (S) immediately follows from Lemma 9. Then,
for any T ⊆ N and any i ∈ T , we have
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
xi
ETy−xf(x)dyi dxi = ∫ 1
0
yiE
T
y−xf(x)dyi = ∫ 1
0
xiE
T∖{i}
y−x f(x)dxi;
(16)
where the rst equality is obtained by permuting the integrals and the second
equality by replacing the integration variable yi with xi. Moreover, we have
immediately
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
xi
f(x)dyi dxi = ∫ 1
0
(1 − xi) f(x)dxi: (17)
Using (14) and repeated applications of (16) and (17), we nally obtain
∫
x∈In ∫yS∈[xS ;1]Sy−xf(x)dyS dx= ∑
T⊆S(−1)∣S∣−∣T ∣ ∫x∈In ∫yS∈[xS ;1]ETy−xf(x)dyS dx= ∑
T⊆S(−1)∣S∣−∣T ∣ ∫In∏i∈T xi ∏i∈S∖T(1 − xi)f(x)dx= ∫
In
∏
i∈S(2xi − 1)f(x)dx = 6−∣S∣ I(f;S);
which completes the proof.
Remark 3. (a) By Lemma 9, we see that I(f;S) can be interpreted as the
average f -volume of the box ∏i∈S[xi; yi] divided by its average volume,
when x and yS are chosen at random with the uniform distribution.
(b) As already mentioned in Remark 2(a), Theorem 10 appears as a natural
generalization of formula (4) (similarly to Proposition 7) in the sense
that the marginal interaction Shf(x) at x is averaged over the whole
domain In (instead of its vertices).
(c) We note a strong analogy between formula (15) and the overall im-
portance index dened by Grabisch and Labreuche in [9, Theorem 1].
Indeed, up to the normalization constant, this importance index is ob-
tained by replacing in formula (15) the operator Sy−x by ESy−x − I.
Moreover, when S is a singleton, both operators coincide and so do the
normalization constants.
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As an immediate consequence of Theorem 10, we have the following in-
terpretation of the index I as an expected value of the dierence quotients
of its argument with respect to some probability distribution.
Corollary 11. For every f ∈ L2(In) and every S ⊆ N , we have
I(f;S) = ∫
x∈In ∫yS∈[xS ;1] pS(x;yS)QSy−xf(x)dyS dx;
where the function pS(x;yS) = 6∣S∣∏i∈S(yi − xi) denes a probability density
function on the set {(x;yS) ∶ x ∈ In;yS ∈ [xS;1]}.
Let us now analyze the behavior of the interaction index I on some special
classes of functions. The following properties generalize in a very natural way
to our setting the behavior of the Banzhaf interaction index IB with respect
to the presence of null players and dummy coalitions.
Recall that a null player in a game (or a set function) v ∈ GN is a player
i ∈ N such that v(T ∪ {i}) = v(T ) for every T ⊆ N ∖ {i}. Equivalently,
the corresponding pseudo-Boolean function f ∶{0;1}n → R, given by (1), is
independent of xi. The notion of null player for games is then naturally
extended through the notion of ineective variables for functions in F (In)
as follows. A variable xi (i ∈ N) is said to be ineective for a function f in
F (In) if f(x) = E{i}−x f(x) for every x ∈ In, or equivalently, if {i}y−xf(x) = 0
for every x;y ∈ In.
Dene If = {i ∈ N ∶ xi ineective for f}. From either (10) or (15), we
immediately derive the following result, which states that any combination of
variables containing at least one ineective variable for a function f ∈ L2(In)
has necessarily a zero interaction.
Proposition 12. For every f ∈ L2(In) and every S ⊆ N such that S∩If ≠ ∅,
we have I(f;S) = 0.
We say that a coalition S ⊆ N is dummy in a game (or a set function)
v ∈ GN if v(R∪T ) = v(R)+v(T )−v(∅) for every R ⊆ S and every T ⊆ N ∖S.
This means that {S;N ∖ S} forms a partition of N such that, for every
coalition K ⊆ N , the relative worth v(K) − v(∅) is the sum of the relative
worths of its intersections with S and N ∖ S. It follows that a coalition S
and its complement N ∖ S are simultaneously dummy in any game v ∈ GN .
We propose the following extension of this concept.
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Denition 13. We say that a subset S ⊆ N is dummy for a function f ∈
F (In) if f(x) = ES−xf(x) +EN∖S−x f(x) − f(0) for every x ∈ In.
The following proposition gives an immediate interpretation of this de-
nition.
Proposition 14. A subset S ⊆ N is dummy for a function f ∈ F (In) if and
only if there exist functions fS; fN∖S ∈ F (In) such that IfS ⊇ N ∖S, IfN∖S ⊇ S
and f = fS + fN∖S.
Proof. For the necessity, just set fS(x) = EN∖S−x f(x)−f(0) and fN∖S = f −fS.
The suciency can be checked directly.
The following result expresses the natural idea that the interaction for
subsets that are properly partitioned by a dummy subset must be zero. It is
an immediate consequence of Propositions 5, 12, and 14.
Proposition 15. For every f ∈ L2(In), every nonempty subset S ⊆ N that
is dummy for f , and every subset K ⊆ N such that K ∩S /= ∅ and K ∖S /= ∅,
we have I(f;K) = 0.
Another immediate consequence of Proposition 12 is that additive func-
tions have zero interaction indexes for s-subsets with s ⩾ 2. This fact can be
straightforwardly extended to the class of k-additive functions as follows.
Denition 16. A function f ∈ L2(In) is said to be k-additive for some k ∈{1; : : : ; n} if there exists a family of functions {fR ∈ L2(In) ∶ R ⊆ N; ∣R∣ ⩽ k}
satisfying IfR ⊇ N ∖R such that f = ∑R fR.
Corollary 17. Let f = ∑R fR ∈ L2(In) be a k-additive function and let S ⊆ N .
We have I(f;S) = 0 if ∣S∣ > k and I(f;S) = I(fS; S) if ∣S∣ = k.
Let us now introduce the concept of S-increasing monotonicity by rening
the classical concept of n-increasing monotonicity for functions of n variables
(see for instance [20, p. 43]).
Denition 18. Let S ⊆ N . We say that a function f ∈ F (In) is S-increasing
if Sy−xf(x) ⩾ 0 for all x;y ∈ In such that x ⩽ y.
The following result then follows immediately from Theorem 10.
Proposition 19. If f ∈ L2(In) is S-increasing for some S ⊆ N , then I(f;S) ⩾
0.
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We end this section by analyzing the behavior of the index I with re-
spect to dualization, which is a standard concept for instance in aggregation
function theory (see [10, p. 48]). The dual of a function f ∈ F (In) is the
function fd ∈ F (In) dened by fd(x) = 1 − f(1N − x). A function f ∈ F (In)
is said to be self-dual if fd = f . By using the change of variables theorem,
we immediately derive the following result.
Proposition 20. For every f ∈ L2(In) and every nonempty S ⊆ N , we haveI(fd; S) = (−1)∣S∣+1I(f;S). Moreover, I(fd;∅) = 1 − I(f;∅). In particular,
if f is self-dual, then I(f;∅) = 1/2 and I(f;S) = 0 whenever ∣S∣ is even.
Remark 4. Given f ∈ L2(In), we dene the self-dual and anti-self-dual parts
of f by f s = (f + fd)/2 and fa = (f − fd)/2, respectively. It follows from
Proposition 20 that, for every nonempty S ⊆ N , we have I(f;S) = I(fa; S)
if ∣S∣ is even, and I(f;S) = I(f s; S) if ∣S∣ is odd.
4. Applications to aggregation function theory
When we need to summarize, fuse, or merge a set of values into a single
one, we usually make use of a so-called aggregation function, e.g., a mean
or an averaging function. Various aggregation functions have been proposed
thus far in the literature, thus giving rise to the growing theory of aggregation
which proposes, analyzes, and characterizes aggregation function classes. For
recent references, see Beliakov et al. [4] and Grabisch et al. [10].
In this context it is often useful to analyze the general behavior of a given
aggregation function f with respect its variables. The index I then oers
a good solution to the problems of (i) determining which variables have the
greatest inuence over f and (ii) measuring how the variables interact within
f .
In this section we rst compute explicit expressions of the interaction
index for the discrete Choquet integral, a noteworthy aggregation function
which has been widely investigated due to its many applications for instance
in decision making (see for instance [12]). Then we proceed similarly for
the class of pseudo-multilinear polynomials, which includes the multiplica-
tive functions and, in particular, the weighted geometric means. Finally, we
introduce a normalized version of the index to compare interactions from
dierent functions and compute the coecient of determination of the mul-
tilinear approximations.
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4.1. Discrete Choquet integrals
A discrete Choquet integral is a function f ∈ F (In) of the form
f(x) = ∑
T⊆N a(T ) mini∈T xi; (18)
where the set function a∶2N → R is nondecreasing with respect to set inclusion
and such that a(∅) = 0 and ∑S⊆N a(S) = 1.2 For general background, see for
instance [10, Section 5.4].
The following proposition yields an explicit expression of the interaction
index for the class of discrete Choquet integrals. We rst consider a lemma
and recall that the beta function is dened, for any integers p; q > 0, by
B(p; q) = ∫ 1
0
tp−1(1 − t)q−1 dt = (p − 1)!(q − 1)!(p + q − 1)! :
Lemma 21. We have
∫[0;1]n mini∈T xi∏i∈S (xi − 12)dx =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩2
−∣S∣B(∣S∣ + 1; ∣T ∣ + 1); if S ⊆ T ;
0; otherwise:
Proof. The result is trivial if S ⊈ T . Thus, we assume that S ⊆ T . Assume
also without loss of generality that T ≠ ∅.
For distinct real numbers x1; : : : ; xn, we have
min
i∈T xi =∑
j∈T xj ∏i∈T∖{j}H(xi − xj);
where H ∶R → R is the Heaviside step function (H(x) = 1 if x ⩾ 0 and 0
otherwise).
2Whether the conditions on the set function a are assumed or not, the function given
in (18) is also called the Lovasz extension of the pseudo-Boolean function f ∣{0;1}n .
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Therefore, we have
∫[0;1]n mini∈T xi∏i∈S (xi − 12)dx = ∫[0;1]∣T ∣ mini∈T xi∏i∈S (xi − 12)∏i∈T dxi=∑
j∈T ∫ 10 (∫[xj ;1]∣T ∣−1∏i∈S (xi − 12) ∏i∈T∖{j}dxi)xj dxj
=∑
j∈S∫ 10 (xj − 12)(xj(1 − xj)2 )∣S∣−1(1 − xj)∣T ∣−∣S∣xj dxj+ ∑
j∈T∖S∫ 10 (xj(1 − xj)2 )∣S∣(1 − xj)∣T ∣−∣S∣−1 xj dxj= −2−∣S∣∫ 1
0
xj
d
dxj
((1 − xj)∣T ∣x∣S∣j )dxj:
We then conclude by calculating this latter integral by parts.
Proposition 22. If f ∈ F (In) is of the form (18), then we haveI(f;S) = 6∣S∣ ∑
T⊇S a(T )B(∣S∣ + 1; ∣T ∣ + 1):
Remark 5. The map a ↦ I(f;S) = 6∣S∣∑T⊇S a(T )B(∣S∣ + 1; ∣T ∣ + 1) denes
an interaction index, in the sense of [8], that is not a probabilistic index
(see [8, Section 3.3]). However, if we normalize this interaction index (with
respect to ∣S∣) to get a probabilistic index, we actually divide I(f;S) by
6∣S∣B(∣S∣ + 1; ∣S∣ + 1) and retrieve the index IM dened in [19].
4.2. Pseudo-multilinear polynomials
We now derive an explicit expression of the index I for the class of pseudo-
multilinear polynomials, that is, the class of multilinear polynomials with
transformed variables.
Denition 23. We say that a function f ∈ L2(In) is a pseudo-multilinear
polynomial if there exists a multilinear polynomial g ∈ F (Rn) and n unary
functions '1; : : : ; 'n ∈ L2(I) such that f(x) = g('1(x1); : : : ; 'n(xn)) for every
x = (x1; : : : ; xn) ∈ In.
Using expression (5) of multilinear polynomials, we immediately see that
any pseudo-multilinear polynomial f ∈ L2(In) can be written in the form
f(x) = ∑
T⊆N a(T )∏i∈T 'i(xi):
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The following result yields an explicit expression of the interaction index
for this function in terms of the interaction indexes for the unary functions
'1; : : : ; 'n.
Proposition 24. For every pseudo-multilinear polynomial f ∈ L2(In) and
every S ⊆ N , we have
I(f;S) = ∑
T⊇S a(T ) ∏i∈T∖S I('i;∅)∏i∈S I('i;{i}):
Proof. By linearity of I, we only have to compute I(∏i∈T 'i; S). It is zero
if S /⊆ T by Proposition 12. If S ⊆ T , we simply use (10) and compute the
integrals separately.
Remark 6. Proposition 24 can actually be easily extended to functions of the
form
f(x) = ∑
T⊆N a(T )∏i∈T 'Ti (xi);
where 'Ti ∈ L2(I) for i = 1; : : : ; n and T ⊆ N .
An interesting subclass of pseudo-multilinear polynomials is the class of
multiplicative functions, that is, functions of the form f(x) = ∏ni=1'i(xi),
where '1; : : : ; 'n ∈ L2(I). For every multiplicative function f ∈ L2(In) and
every S ⊆ N , assuming I(f;∅) /= 0, the ratio I(f;S)/I(f;∅) is also multi-
plicative in the sense that I(f;S)I(f;∅) =∏i∈S I('i;{i})I('i;∅) : (19)
Combining this with (12) and the identity ∑T⊆N ∏i∈T zi = ∏i∈N(1 + zi), we
can write the best nth approximation of f as
fn(x) = I(f;∅)∏
i∈N (1 + I('i;{i})I('i;∅) (xi − 12)):
4.3. Normalized index and coecients of determination
Just as for interaction indexes introduced in game theory [13] and the
importance index dened by Grabisch and Labreuche [9], the interaction
index I is a linear map. This implies that it cannot be considered as an
absolute interaction index but rather as a relative index constructed to assess
and compare interactions for a given function.
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If we want to compare interactions for dierent functions, we need to
consider an absolute (normalized) interaction index. Such an index is actually
easy to dene if we use the following probabilistic viewpoint: considering the
unit cube In as a probability space with respect to the Lebesgue measure,
we see that, for a nonempty subset S ⊆ N , the index I(f;S) is actually the
covariance of the random variables f and 12∣S∣/2wS. It is then natural to
consider the Pearson (or correlation) coecient instead of the covariance.
Denition 25. The normalized interaction index is the mapping
r∶{f ∈ L2(In) ∶ (f) ≠ 0} × (2N ∖ {∅})→ R
dened by
r(f;S) = I(f;S)
12∣S∣/2 (f) = ⟨f −E(f)(f) ;wS⟩ ;
where E(f) and (f) are the expectation and the standard deviation of f ,
respectively, when f is regarded as a random variable.
From this denition it follows that −1 ⩽ r(f;S) ⩽ 1. Moreover, this index
remains unchanged under interval scale transformations, that is, r(af+b; S) =
r(f;S) for all a > 0 and b ∈ R. Note also that the normalized indexes for a
function f ∈ L2(In) and its dual fd are linked by r(fd; S) = (−1)∣S∣+1 r(f;S),
where S ≠ ∅.
Let us examine on a few examples the behavior of the normalized impor-
tance index r(f;{i}) of a variable xi:
 For the arithmetic mean f(x) = 1n ∑ni=1 xi, we have (f) = (12n)1/2,I(f;{i}) = 1/n for all i ∈ N , and hence r(f;{i}) = 1/√n.
 For the minimum function f(x) =mini∈N xi, we have
(f) = √n(n + 1)√n + 2
(see [19, Lemma 6]). By Proposition 22, we then have
r(f;{i}) = √3√
n(n + 2)
for every i ∈ N . By duality, the same result holds for the maximum
function fd(x) = maxi∈N xi. From this fact, we measure the intuitive
fact that the overall importance of a given variable is greater in the
arithmetic mean than in the minimum and the maximum functions.
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 Consider the weighted geometric mean f(x) =∏ni=1 xcii , where c1; : : : ; cn ⩾
0 and ∑ni=1 ci = 1. Using (19), for every nonempty subset S ⊆ N , we
have I(f;S) =∏
i∈N
1
ci + 1∏i∈S 6cici + 2 :
In the special case of the symmetric geometric mean function, we have
r(f;{i}) = √3
2n + 1(( (n + 1)2n(n + 2))n − 1)−1/2:
Here again, we can show that the importance of variables in the arith-
metic mean is greater than the importance of variables in the geometric
mean function.
The normalized index is also useful to compute the coecient of deter-
mination of the best kth approximation of f .3 Assuming that (f) ≠ 0, this
coecient is given by
R2k(f) = 2(fk)2(f) :
Since E(fk) = I(fk;∅) = I(f;∅) = E(f) (see Proposition 3), by (8), we
obtain
2(fk) = ∥fk −E(fk)∥2 = ∥ ∑
T⊆N
1⩽∣T ∣⩽k
⟨f;wT ⟩wT∥2 = ∑
T⊆N
1⩽∣T ∣⩽k
⟨f;wT ⟩2
and hence
R2k(f) = ∑
T⊆N
1⩽∣T ∣⩽k
r(f; T )2: (20)
Remark 7. The coecient of determination explains why the normalized
importance of each variable in the arithmetic mean is greater than that in the
minimum function, the maximum function, and the geometric mean function.
Indeed, if f is a symmetric function, then r(f;{i}) = r(f;{j}) for every
i; j ∈ N and, since R21(f) ⩽ 1, by (20) we have r(f;{i}) ⩽ 1/√n.
3This coecient actually measures the goodness of t of the multilinear model.
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